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THE FORCES OF LIFE
AND THE CAUSES OF DEATH
Xavier Bichat's Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort was published the
year that the century turned. This seems fitting, for the work is a superb synthesis ofa
great many of the important concepts concerning the living body which had evolved
during the eighteenth century. In a sense, it sums up the state that medical theory had
achieved by them. While studying La vie et la mort, one sees unmistakably that Bichat
was an heir to the vitalists, the organicists, and the sensationalists. In it, Bichat
examined the living organism with a view to discerning and describing those
characteristics which he believed divide it so utterly from the inert one. Here, he
argued with enormous conviction on behalf of the separation of the science of life
from that of non-living things with which, he believed, it shares virtually no common
ground. Here also, he developed his arguments on behalfofsubdividing physiological
forces and processes into animal and organic categories. Each life was examined in
terms ofits supposed properties, its consciousness, its ability to learn, its birth, and its
death.
Had Bichat not gone to Paris in 1793, it is unlikely that he would have been able to
achieve this and hence any other ofhis major works. Like a great magnet, that city has
always drawn France's most ambitious and creative men to itself. Even in the 1790s,
the decade ofthe most intense travail it has ever suffered, it held out to Bichat and to
others the possibility of an opportunity to study, to make important contacts, and to
achieve professional advancement in general. As we have seen, Bichat obtained all
these things from Paris, largely as a consequence of his very lucky adoption by
Desault. The vitalist theory was, by then, widely diffused. And the forces ofsensibility
and contractility, which preoccupied the organicists, had been, as we have seen, the
subjects of assiduous examination for about half a century before Bichat tackled
them. The sensationalist theory, albeit of at least seventeenth-century origin, was
being subjected to particularly intense scrutiny and application, and that largely in
Paris at the very time that Bichat worked there. Bichat used this theory and its
attendant epistemology as a kind of binding agent to link together all the other ele-
ments ofhis work.
It is unlikely that Bichat ever went to Auteuil. In fact, he probably had little ifany-
thing to do personally with many of the politically-minded philosophes whose ideas
had been shaped in Madame Helvetius's salon. That made little difference, however,
for Condillac's philosophy had become the common property of Parisian scientists
and intellectuals. The Societe M6dicale d'tmulation must have been a particularly
important centre for the diffusion of sensationalist ideas. Apart from that, however,
all the concepts we have so far examined were widely discussed at the Hotel-Dieu, as
much a part of the institution as the vermin that crept along its walls. There could
have been few more intellectually stimulating medical establishments anywherejust at
the turn ofthe century.
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To dissect La vie et la mort into the elements that compose it is to be brought face
to face with notions clearly developed by persons whose work we have been examin-
ing. Bichat admitted as much, pointing out that all those persons who had read
Aristotle, Buffon, Morgagni, Haller, Bordeu, and others of similar persuasion would
see sources of his ideas there. He saw himself, much as we do, as working in a tradi-
tion stretching all the way back to Aristotle. It was not his intention to deceive his
readers, he wrote (probably quite truthfully), for "those authors are so well known
that I thought it useless to note the critical citations exactly."' In any case, it is worth
remembering that eighteenth-century authors did not tend to be scrupulous about
sifting original ideas from borrowed ones. La vie et la mort, in spite of its borrowed
elements, is important because of what Bichat did with his predecessors' notions.
Analytic methodology notwithstanding, the complete work is greater than the sum of
its parts. The success ofBichat's published writings and the considerable reputation he
achieved in a short time attest to the fact that his synthesis and application of
physiological theory were unique. It is significant that when Franqois Magendie and
Claude Bernard were striving to create a deterministic science of physiology, they
found it necessary to marshal many of their arguments specifically against those of
Bichat, who had denied thepossibility ofwhat they were attempting.
Bichat opened La vie et la mort with the simple assertion: "Life consists in the sum
of the functions which resist death."2 The ephemeral mystery of life and of our con-
sciousness has captivated human curiosity since our mind emerged from a kind of
animal semiconsciousness of itself. Bichat dealt with a timeless mystery a bit
prosaically, perhaps, by contending that to be alive means fundamentally to be an
organized material unit battling subversive forces. With good reason, commentators
have generally dismissed the definition as a tautology that enlightens little. It has
much in common with Stahl's definition of life as "the conversation of an eminently
corruptible body, the faculty or force with whose aid the body is sheltered from the act
of corruption."3 Both men perceived the living body as a kind of organic island,
besieged without reprieve by ravaging forces that would dissolve its organization and
integrity. According to Bichat, "under such circumstances [living bodies] could not
long subsist were they not possessed in themselves of a permanent principle of reac-
tion. This principle is that oflife; unknown in its nature, it can only be appreciated by
its phenomena." This elaboration does little to dispel the fog, serving no purpose for
one desiring something tangible and precise. In fact, it can be quite accurately
paraphrased to say that living bodies are alive because they possess the principle of
life. In the meantime, in addition to combating the external environment, the life
principle directs growth and development. In the child, Bichat wrote, the reactive
capacity is superior to the action imposed from without, and there is growth; in the
adult, there is a balance between action and reaction; in the old man, life languishes
until the reaction overtakes and destroys it.4
' Xavier Bichat, 'Preface', Recherchesphysiologiques sur la vie et la mort, Paris, Brosson, Gabon, 1800,
pp. i-iv. Hereinafter cited as La vieetlamort.
2 Ibid., p. i.
IGeorg Ernst Stahl, 'Vrai th6orie medicale', in Oeuvres mMdico-philosophiques etpratiques, 6 vols., ed.
by Theodore Blondin, Paris, Bailliere, 1860, vol. 3, p. 43.
4Bichat, La vieet lamort, p. i.
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Every child quickly learns that there are endless varieties of life in the world. He
perceives without much apparent difficulty that a plant, a fish, and his pet cat are all
alive, as he himselfis. This is acquired as an intuition long before he can find words to
explain it. Indeed, to describe the thread of reality common to life's myriad species,
which ties them together as participants in the experience of life, is veFy difficult. We
all acquire at least some sense ofa chain ofbeing that runs through nature, uniting the
simpler forms oflife by imperceptibly gradated degrees to the more complex ones. To
define and to understand this complexity was one ofBichat's principal undertakings in
La vie et la mort. It was above all the notion of two distinct lives that allowed him to
make sense ofliving diversity. Accordingly, as we havealready had occasion to see, he
based much else upon it.
What Bichat called the organic life includes all those functions that are normally
internal, passive, and unperceived. It corresponds to the plant life ofthe ancient Greek
triumvirate of plant, animal, and rational souls. Its realm is the same one Helmont
had assigned to the great integrative archeus. When Stahl placed all animal activity
under the control of a single rational soul, he actually created conceptual difficulties
for subsequent theorists. By not distinguishing between conscious and unconscious
functions, animism made the chain ofbeing more difficult to comprehend. Thus it was
that Sauvages was led to subdivide the soul into faculties, a device that effectively per-
mitted him to revert to a traditional tripartite division. He believed that the functions
Bichat later termed organic were partially, but not exclusively, mechanical. Barthez
assigned them to a vital principle. With the exception ofStahl, all believed that there
arelivingfunctionsthatexist apart from theconscious psychical life. Above all, they all
assumed that the willed, rational and conscious activity is linked to a soul, which is, at
the same time, a spiritual entity. Like Bichat, then, all assumed that life has levels
into which it must besubdivided to be understood.
Bichat nevertheless considered his particular animal-organic classification to be
unique, unrelated to his predecessors' classifications in several important ways.
Though Grimaud had stated it clearly,Bichat alone took credit for perceiving its
implications. "In reflecting upon the [animal-organic] distinction", he remarked, "I
soon perceived that it was not only one ofthose vast and comprehensive views, one of
those great and luminous conceptions that frequently occur to the man ofgenius who
studies physiology; but that it might be made the basis of a methodological
classification."5 In his introductory remarks to the Anatomie ge'nerale, he contended
that Grimaud's particular approach, albeit obviously helpful, lacked precision: that is
to say, Grimaud acknowledged only the sensations and motions among the external
functions. He did not hold the brain to be their centre and had neglected the voice.
Internal functions had been only partially examined, and no consideration had been
given to the special status of the organs of generation. In fact, Grimaud's division
was merely a minor point in the larger context of his study of nutrition. What was
merely a classificatory convenience for him became a key concept for Bichat, central
to his very conception ofvital function and vital law.6
Xavier Bichat, Anatomie generale appliquee a la physiologie et a la medecine, 4 vols., Paris, Brosson,
Gabon, 1801, vol. 1, pp. xcix-cxii. Hereinafter cited as Anatomiegenerale.
6The naturalist Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon had also written of two lives and of the life proper to
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The organic life is the essential one and therefore universally distributed throughout
all living things. It was this fundamental quality that Bichat had in mind when he des-
cribed the plant as "only the sketch or rather the ground work for the animal . . . for
the formation ofthe latter, it has been necessary to clothe the formerwith an apparatus
ofexternal organs by which it must beconnected with external objects." When animal
life is fused on to it, our organism "senses, it perceives, it reflects on its sensations, it
moves voluntarily in response to their influences and it communicates its desires, fears,
pleasures and pains."7 In an 1822 edition of La vie et la mort, Magendie commented
aptly but tersely that this was a "more brilliant than profound view ofthe subject".8
Bichat found that in the animal, one can distinguish between the organs of the two
lives in a number of ways. The parts belonging to the animal life are symmetrical,
whereas those of the organic one are irregular in form; animal life is harmonious or
regular in its activity, while organic life is not; animal life operates only intermittently,
but organic life must be constantly active; animal life is modified by habit, whereas
organic life is unaffected by it; rationality belongs to the animal life, while passions
are connected to the organic life; animal activity commences at birth, and organic
activity is present from the moment ofconception; animal life alone can be educated.
Because animal life cannot exist without organic life, the former leaves the body first
at death.
He had at least the outlines of this distinction as early as 1798, for that year he
published in the Memoires delaSocie'te' Me'dicaled'kmulation a paper concerning the
differences in form between the organs of two lives. Whereas a tree has only randoni
branches on an irregular trunk, animal limbs are always symmetrically arranged on
an irregularly shaped body. A single organ ofthe animal life is always placed along or
in relation to a median line that divides the body into two halves. Thus it is that two
similar eyes receive light impressions, and the tongue is split by a median line. The
nerves that transmit sensory impressions from the eyes, ears, and so on to the brain
are symmetrical, as are those which go from the brain to the larynx and locomotive
organs. The brain itselfexists in two apparently identical parts. On the other hand, the
digestive organs, liver, spleen, heart, aorta, vena cava, and other vessels are not
absolutely regular.
But all the evidence did not quite fit, and Bichat had to do some verbal juggling to
salvage what he was convinced was a physiological principle. The apparent regularity
of the glands and kidneys, he warned, is merely illusory. One human lung, for
example, has two lobes, and the other three. Furthermore, the nerves and vessels
supplying the two sides vary considerably in shape and direction. The pancreas, liver,
and salivary glands are not quite on the median line, and so on. The reproductive
system participates in both lives and is, as one might expect, symmetrical.
each part ofthe body. This idea belongs to theconcept ofthe chain ofbeing, a beliefin thecontinuity oflife,
which the biologist attempts to classify into order, genus, and species. The connexion between Buffon and
Bichat, was first drawn in A. Arene, 'Essai sur la philosophie de Xavier Bichat', Arch. Anth. Crim., 191 1,
26: 32-35.
7Bichat, La vieet lamort, pp. 1-9.
'Francois Magendie, note to Bichat, La vie et la mort, 4th ed., augmented with notes by F. Magendie,
Paris, Bechet, 1822, pp. 6-7.
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In other instances, Bichat's examples in support ofhis viewpoint are rather intrigu-
ing and in some sense more persuasive. He interpreted the evidence surrounding sym-
metry, for example, in such a way as to determine that it increases in proportion to a
species' location on the chain ofbeing. Man, nature's allegedly most perfect animal, is
also its most symmetrical one. The lowly oyster, on the other hand, is irregular and
confined to theshell that covers it, preventing it from having any relation with external
bodies. Caterpillars and butterflies are symmetrical. When they enter the intermediate
or cocoon stage of their existence, however, they collect themselves into irregularly
shaped shells and livecompletely internalized lives.9
The somewhat cynical reader may not be surprised at Bichat's claim that the sym-
metry principlc was original to him. I believe, however, that the catalyst for the idea
was Bordeu's tissu muqueux, also known in the eighteenth century as cellular tissue.
We generally know it today as connective tissue. In the work, Bordeu described a
raphe ge'ne'rale, a kind of constriction that divides the body into right and left sides.
The diaphragm isdivided into muscles that aredirected toward the spine and sternum;
there is a mediastinum; a division is evident in the trachea, thyroid gland, thyroid
cartilage, cricoid, epiglottis, and nostrils; the oesophagus and pharynx are separated
posteriorly by a line or crimping together of fibres; the tongue has a median line; the
vertebrae and even the intestines are divided into demicanals; the brain, pineal gland,
liver, and pancreas are located in the centre ofthe body and divided into two parts; the
mucous tissue itself is constricted at its centre and so divided as to form a pocket on
either side of the body.'0 There is good reason to suppose that whenever Bichat
referred critically to Bordeu's work, he was in fact borrowing and developing it
somehow. Thus it was that in 1798, he accused Bordeu of making a forced and
unnatural application ofa worthy principle. Ifone merely glances at the list oforgans
offered above by Bordeu, it is clear that he did not limit symmetry to the organs of
what Bichat called the animal life. And Bichat had the advantage ofthe last word.
The symmetry ofthe organs ofthe animal life is paralleled, according to Bichat, by
harmony of function. Buffon had observed that there is a harmony of action of the
eyes and ears. There is a discordance in the voice, he said, if there is a discordance in
the two halves of the larynx. From similar considerations, Bichat derived a second
"principle of life", which stated that "harmony is the character of external functions
while discordance is the attribute of organic functions". We sense confusedly, he
wrote, ifone eye or ear or nostril is stronger than the other or ifone part ofthe body is
affected by paralysis or spasm. A lack ofharmony in thehemispheres ofthe brain will
cause the soul to perceive confusedly. He observed that compression of one of the
hemispheres by pus or blood is sometimes known to produce confusion in persons and
in animals." Whereas the fact that one is always left- or right-handed seems to con-
tradict the notion ofharmony, Bichat put the phenomenon down to habit. Harmony is
not important, however, for the organic life. It makes no difference, for example, if
9 Xavier Bichat, 'Organes a forme symmetrique', Memoires de la Societe MWdicale d'Emulation 1798, 2:
477-487; and La vieet la mort, pp. 10-19.
10Theophile de Bordeu, 'Recherches sur le tissue muqueux ou l'organe cellulaire', in Oeuvres completes,
2 vols., Paris, Caille et Ravier, 1818, vol. 2, pp. 753-755; also briefly discussed in 'Recherches sur les
maladies chroniques', in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 801-802.
"Bichat, La vie et la mort, pp. 20-36.
104Theforces oflife and the causes ofdeath
one kidney is more active than the other or if one salivary gland secretes more saliva
than the other. Furthermore, the activity of the glandular system, the circulation, or
the respiration is constantly varying as much as twofold or threefold under the
influence ofvarious causes.'2
As inharmoniously as the organic functions may occur, however, they must never
be interrupted. It is clear that respiration, circulation, exhalation, absorption, nutri-
tion, assimilation, and decomposition must be continuous. The organs of the animal
life, on the other hand, are subject to fatigue and must periodically relax. Rest may be
the repose ofa single fatigued organ or, when the brain is resting, a generalized sleep.'3
As we have observed, this notion came directly from Grimaud and indirectly from
Barthez, who had stated that only organs "necessary to life" enjoy continual excita-
tion by the vital principle.'4
A particularly interesting part of Bichat's examination of the two lives had to do
with the process oflearning. Only the animal lifecan be taught, he wrote. His assump-
tions were largely sensationalist ones. Like many other men at the time, he believed
that habit is of primary importance in permitting one to learn something of some
object. An initial impression, Bichat wrote, is merely agreeable or disagreeable. It is
confused and inexact until such time as we begin to decompose it into its parts. To
illustrate this point, he used the example of a field offlowers, much as Condillac had
offered the view ofa countryside. Bichat considered this analysis ofthe components of
some larger whole to be an exercise ofjudgement.
Unfortunately, he went on, there is an inverse relationship between appreciating
something and understanding it. "The more we consider an object, the less sensitive
we are to its agreeable or disagreeable qualities, but at the same time, the better we
may judge its attributes." We become accustomed not only to a beautiful view but
also to an irritating foreign body in contact with a mucous membrane.'5 Though we
are aware ofa sudden passage from hot to cold surroundings or the other way around,
we soon cease to notice the new temperature. Neither the perfumer nor the cook is
sensible of the odours surrounding him. This dulling of sensations by habit is not a
function of the sensory organs, but rather of the mind itself, which compares each
sensation with preceding ones. "The greater the difference between the actual and the
past impression, the livelier will be the sentiment. The sensations which affect us the
most are those which we have never before experienced." Thus pain and pleasure tend
to their own annihilation. The poets' sentiments, it appears, must retreat before
physiological processes, for there can be no eternal sorrows.'6
These words make it clear that Bichat knew Cabanis' ideas well and found them to
be persuasive. Some of Bichat's handwritten lecture notes are preserved at the Library
12 Ibid., pp. 36-38.
3 Ibid., pp. 39-46.
14 Paul Joseph Barthez, Nouveaux elements de la science deIlhomme, Montpellier, J. Martel aine, 1778,
pp. 235-244.
1' Because mucous membranes line organs in contact with the exterior, such as the bladder and the gut,
Bichat taught that it was possible that they shared some ofthe characteristics ofthe animal life. Hence these
organs respond to habit.
16 Bichat, La vie et la mort, pp. 47-56; compare Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, 'Essai sur l'origine des
connaissances humaines', in Oeuvrescomplkes, 23 vols., Paris, Ch. Houel, 1798, vol. 1, pp. 157-172.
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of the Paris Medical Faculty, among them twenty-nine pages entitled 'Discours sur
l'etude de la physiologie'. They tell us that Bichat taught his students that "all the
sciences are divided into the moral and physical sciences", an idea clearly taken from
Cabanis. After a note concerning life's division into two categories, he instructed
himself, "Speak here of Cabanis", and observed, "Since Locke and Condillac found
the source ofour ideas in the senses, it is essential to know these senses'". The conne-
xion between some of Bichat's ideas and those of Cabanis or the other ideologues is
made abundantly clear in La vie etla mort also.
The question of the role of habit in the intellectual operations interested both
Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis, both of whom read papers on the subject before the
second class ofthe Institute in 1798. In the kElments d'ideologie, which appeared the
same year as La vie et la mort, Destutt de Tracy argued that habit affects our sensa-
tions, motions, memories, desires, andjudgements. As we have seen, Cabanis treated
the subject again in Rapports duphysique et morale de l'homme.'8 In fact, he accused
Bichat of plagiarism in the preface to the book. While discussing the general topic of
the science of man, he appended a footnote stating that he hadjust heard of Bichat's
death, and sharply accusing persons who, without scruple, get hold ofothers' ideas but
neglect to indicate their sources.'9 His sense of injustice probably stemmed largely
from this element ofBichat's work.
In 1803, the Institute awarded a prize to one Maine de Biran for a paper on
'L'influence de l'habitude sur la faculte de penser'. Maine de Biran was sharply
criticized subsequently for not having named Bichat in the work. He defended himself
by saying that when he began his work in 1799, La vie et la mort had not yet appeared.
On seeing Bichat's book later, he was pleased to see the basis of an idea that he had
thought to be exclusively his own.20 Such confusion about priorities arose largely
because certain ideas floating about medical circles were there for anyone who cared
to develop them. Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Bichat, and Maine de Biran were all in
Paris about 1800, and they all had occasion to hear something about the relationships
between sensations, the internal organs, will, habit, and intelligence.
Habit, according to Bichat, belongs only to the animal life, however. Indeed, life
would clearly be menaced if visceral organs were thus affected. Its effect on the
organic life is minor, therefore, limited to modifying the hungry stomach and the
excretory organs. Even in those two cases, however, Bichat claimed that it does so in
proportion to the extent to which these particular functions participate in the animal
life because oftheir contact with such foreign substances as food orexcrement.2'
17These notes by Bichat were reprinted as a 'Discours sur l'etude de la phisiologie', ed. by A. Arene,
Arch. Anthr. Crim., 1911, 26: 161-172. The original manuscript in Bichat's almost impossible hand is in the
Bibliotheque de l'Ecole de la M6decine, Box 46, no. VIII. It is translated by William Randall Albury as the
'Discourse on the study ofphysiology', Stud. Hist. Biol., 1977, 1: 97-105.
" Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du morale de I'homme, 4th ed., 2 vols., Paris,
Bechet, 1924, vol. 1, p. 187.
19 Ibid., p. xiv.
20That letter was discovered in this century and reproduced by V. A. Bertrand in 'Xavier Bichat et Maine
de Biran', Arch. Anthr. Crim., I911, 26: 434-443. The dispute was also discussed by Arene, op. cit., note 6
above.
21 Bichat, La vieet la mort, pp. 56-57.
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Because of his internal organs, Bichat's man or animal was very different from
Condillac's statue, which possessed only the organs ofwhat he called the animal life.
Condillac had described a passion as a dominant desirederiving from the memory ofa
pleasant sensation that the statute wished to recreate.22 Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis
had allowed that internal sensations may modify external ones. Bichat, however, set
out todemonstrate that the passions-anger, love,joy, sorrow, and so on -originate in
the organic life. Without external sensations to put him in contact with the larger life,
of course, man would be bereft of all intellectual activity. But without the internal
sensations that give rise to the passions, he would presumably lack the qualities that
shape the personality and provide life with its colour. The two lives are occasionally at
war in the body, with the passions opposing thejudgement and intellect ofthe animal
life.
Anger, fear, andjoy all variously affect the heart rate and the circulation; respira-
tion is oppressive when one is very sad; certain passions affect the digestive system,
causing vomiting or indigestion. That, wrote Bichat, is because these are the sources
ofthe respective passions. Even gestures, he claimed, attest to the connexion between
the passions and the organic life. To indicate an expression ofjoy, love, hatred, or
sadness, one gestures toward the heart, the stomach, or the intestines. Popular expres-
sions to the effect that fury circulates in the veins and stirs up the bile, that anger
makes the heart leap, and thatjealousy distils its passions into the heart, wrote Bichat,
owe as much to physiology as to poetry.
It follows, naturally enough, that organic dispositions contribute to the personality.
A person with a strong pulmonary apparatus and energetic circulation possesses what
has long been labelled a sanguine temperament, which disposes him to anger and to
courage. Envy and hate are more pronounced in someone in whom the bilious system
dominates. The opposite ofthe impetuous, sanguine man is the inactive and dull one,
in whom the lymphatics aregreatly developed. The imagery ofthe temperaments is, of
course, at least as old as Aristotle. Ifone accepts this viewpoint, it necessarily follows
that man is unavoidably assisted or incapacitated by his unique and largely unalter-
able physiological make-up.
Human passions alter over a lifetime. Childhood, Bichat wrote, is an age oftimidity,
because organization is feeble. In youth, the pulmonary and vascular systems are
more developed, presumably somehow accounting for the qualities of one's
personality in those years. Maturity is the age ofvirility, ambition, envy, and intrigue -
all somehow having to do with the alleged fact that the activity ofthe liver and gastric
apparatus is pronounced. Although plants possess an organic life, they lack passions,
because they have neither sensory apparatus nor appropriate viscera.
Even though they originate in the organic life, the passions frequently affect the
animal life. An angry man's muscular force is doubled or even trebled because of an
increase in the power of his heart, and hence in the quantity of circulating blood.
Indeed, passions produce a thousand involuntary nuances of force, even in voluntary
muscles. These effects are the result of sympathies, imperceptible connexions that
exist between two remote and apparently unrelated parts ofthe body. Bichat probably
borrowed this notion and even the term from Barthez. Therefore, while it would seem
22 Condillac, 'Traite des sensations', in Oeuvres compltes, op. cit., note 16 above, vol. 1, pp. 90-95.
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that the brain ought not to be affected by the liver, stomach, or intestines, there are
numerous sympathies between these organs. They must exist also between the viscera
and the voluntary muscles themselves.
The intellect and the passions, therefore, coexist in a kind of balance in the body.
For example, Bichat wrote, a man who gets bad news when he is before a crowd cons-
trains his normal responses. "It is the brain whose action has surmounted that of the
stomach, the liver and so on; it is the animal life which has reclaimed its empire." The
happiest man is one in whom the two lives are in equilibrium, so that the cerebral and
internal centres exercise an equal control.23 This discussion brings to mind the fourth
book of Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's travels, in which the hero visits the land of the
Houyhnhnms. These animals, much like horses in appearance, lead superbly rational
and ordered lives. They achieve their unparalleled comfort and sobriety, however,
because they are never deflected by passions or emotions. Their opposites are the
vulgar, unpredictable, violent, and emotional Yahoos, who bear an unmistakable
physical resemblance to humans. Bichat probably knew nothing ofSwift, but in effect
he provided a kind ofphysiological rationale for his fanciful and satirical venture into
the realm ofthe psyche.
Bichat found that he could distinguish between the two lives on the basis of their
origin and development as well. The organic life, he wrote, is active from the moment
ofconception, but animal lifedoes not truly begin until thesenses, the brain, theorgans
oflocomotion, and the voice begin to be exercised after birth. Condillac's statue began
to develop its mental faculties only when it had two odours, two temperatures, or any
other two sensations to compare. In the womb's constant milieu, the foetus has no
consciousness of the medium that nourishes it or the heat that penetrates it. Its
motions are unconscious and unwilled, deriving from sympathies between internal
organs. The very existence of the foetus, Bichat wrote, "is that of a vegetable and its
destruction can only be said to be that of a living being and not of an animated one."
It followed that wherever there is any question of saving a mother's life or that ofher
unborn child, the decision is properly made on the mother's behalf.
Bichat must have had Condillac's work near at hand when he wrote the following
lines concerning the newborn:
The sensations are at first confused; they transmit only general images; the eye has only the sensation of
light; the ear has only that ofgeneral sound; the nose only that ofsmell. As yet, there is nothing distinct
in the general affections ofthe senses; but from habit the strength ofthe first impression is lessened and
particular sensations begin to take place.
So the animal goes on to develop its mental faculties. "The powers of perception,
memory and imagination all of which are preceded and occasioned by the sensations
increase and extend in proportion as by repeated excitement they are exercised." At
first, the cries of young animals are only confused and unformed sounds with no
particular character. Children affect the characteristic sounds of their species only
after long effort. In a newborn animal, the limbs are constantly in motion, as it
attempts to experience more sensations. Only in time does it learn co-ordination ofits
muscles.24 In the 1822 edition of La vie et la mort, Magendie sensibly pointed out, for
23 Bichat, La vie et la mort, pp. 58-91.
24 Ibid., pp. 134-151.
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example, that a ewe can distinguish the voice of her lamb in the flock from the very
beginning. As any farmer knows well, there is no question of an animal's having to
learn to make and to distinguish the sounds of its species. Nor do the motions of the
locomotive organs always require any more education than does the heart. A
partridge, for example, emerges running from its shell.25 Obviously, there are
countless similar examples to be had, ifone but thinks about the problems for a while.
Bichat divided the education ofthe external life into threecategories: the senses, the
brain, and the body. The first division includes the visual arts, music, cooking,
perfumery, and so on; the second has to do with poetry and the sciences; the third con-
cerns riding, dancing, and the mechanical arts. They exist in a reciprocal relationship,
he wrote, so that while the philosopher is often physically awkward, the dancer is
usually not too bright. This provided him with yet another principle, the "fundamental
law ofthe distribution ofvital powers". He believed that a "determinate sum offorces
or powers have been spread throughout life; this sum must always remain the same
whether its distribution is equal or not; the inactivity of one organ necessarily
supposes activity in another." To apply oneself to several studies at once is probably
to succeed at none ofthem. Another consequence ofthe principle is that while hearing
and touch are strong in a blind man, the deaf and dumb man has more accurate
eyesight. An eagle has piercing sight but an obscure sense ofsmell, while the opposite
is true ofthe dog. When vital powers arecentred in one life, they are relatively inactive
in another. When digestion is going on, for example, the powers of life are centred in
that system, and the animal becomes sleepy. Bichat clearly would have considered
football scholarships inappropriate for a university.
As a consequence of this same law of the distribution of living forces, Bichat said,
various organs are perfected at different stages of life. In infancy, the senses are
particularly educated, and the nervous system is proportionately greater in relation to
the muscular system than later. In youth, memory and imagination become more
active, while in adulthood, the faculty ofjudgement is developed. In view of this, we
would do well to apply children to dancing and music, young people to the fine arts,
and the adult to logic and mathematics.
Organic life, ineducable and unaffected by habit, is present from the moment of
conception. The heart is the first organ to be formed and to begin acting in the foetus.
At the beginning of life, the vital powers are concentrated on growth and nutrition.
Exhalation, respiration, and digestion begin only after birth.26
Bichat did not discuss the possible social consequences ofhis physiological theory,
though other persons would do so. I commented earlier that it seems to follow from
the principles of Locke and Condillac that all human beings possess an equal potential
at birth. The infinite variability of our species presumably springs from the complex
effects of the environment. This was also the viewpoint of such ideologues as
Helvetius, Turgot, and Condorcet. Frank Manuel has shown that it was really only
during the French Revolution that Frenchmen began to abandon the seductive notion
of innate human equality. Cabanis presented papers before the Class of Moral and
Political Sciences of the Institute, arguing that man's physical and moral being is
25 Magendie, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 204-205.
26 Bichat, La vie etlamort, pp. 147-177.
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widely affected by age, sex, climate, and many other such variables.2" Now Bichat
would have it that the human temperament and moral character are consequences not
only of the environment but also of one's spleen, heart, lungs, and gastrointestinal
tract. At best, one can hope to modify one's character by training the will and judge-
ment to moderate impulses coming from the passions ofthe uneducated internal life.
One is also assisted or fettered, according to Bichat, by the limitations ofthe animal
life. We observed earlier that to receive a sound education, one must concentrate upon
the activities ofthe senses, the brain, or the muscles. One cannot be a good musician,
philosopher, and athlete. The division ofthe animal life into three parts was developed
in a most interesting way during the Restoration by the ComtedeSaint-Simon, whose
political and social philosophy was rooted in a notion of human inequality. He first
discovered Bichat's work about 1822 and used it to postulate a hypothetical society in
which people were to be channelled according to their natural abilities. "Brain men"
would become scientists; "sensory men" would be poets, religious leaders, and ethical
teachers; "motor men", the intellectually mediocre majority, would be either
industrial workers or administrators.2
Finally, Bichat showed that the two lives remain distinct from each other even at
death. An ageing person dies gradually. Hearing, sight, taste, and touch fade slowly
but perceptibly. Imagination, perception, and memory slow. The muscles of locomo-
tion and the voice falter as the brain becomes less and less active. The imagination
weakens, so that often an old man can recall events long past while being unaware of
the present. While this goes on, the organic life continues unabated. We fear death,
Bichat observed, because we fear extinction of our consciousness. This fading of the
animal life, therefore, is really an advantage, for one gradually approaches the veget-
able state, thereby removing fear ofextinction.29
The animal-organic division was a device that frequently permitted Bichat to
reconcile the apparently conflicting notions and conclusions of such physicians as
Haller and the Montpellier vitalists. It provided him with a kind of conceptual
framework around which he proceeded to build his arguments on behalf of vital
theory and tissue theory. In all the work he did subsequently in physiology and
anatomy, he never lost sight ofwhat he saw as a critical natural division.
One ofthe most important and instructive features ofBichat's work for the medical
historian is his theoretical statement on behalf ofthe rejection ofmechanism and the
27 Frank E. Manuel, 'From equality to organicism', J. Hist. Ideas, 1956, 17: 54-69. See also Manuel's
Theprophets ofParis, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1962, pp. 105-148.
28 Manuel (1956), op. cit., note 27 above. This provoked a novel approach to Bichat's physiology on the
part of John V. Pickstone, 'Bureaucracy, liberalism, and the body in post-revolutionary France: Bichat's
physiology and the Paris School of Medicine', Hist. Sci., 1981, 19: 115-142. Striving mightily for a social
interpretation of the apparently apolitical Bichat's work, Pickstone argues that Bichat, like Saint-Simon,
saw the bodily parts through an imagery of state organization so that his physiology represents a kind of
"bureaucratic corporitism" in which the anatomical elements were also functional elements. On pp.
133-134, he gives an organizational chart comparing Bichat's physiology and a model of social organiza-
tion characteristic of his time, claiming that a "social physiology was a plausible representation ofofficial
France during the Directory". He even compares Bichat's tripod oflife to the interactions ofthe Directors,
each with their separate executive functions. The "linguistic habits" to which he attributes this convergence
ofideas notwithstanding, I find the argument facile, albeit ingenious.
29 Bichat. La vie et la mort, pp. 178-189.
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support of vital theory. By this time, there were few defenders of traditional
mechanism. Theeighteenth-century medical world belonged to physicians who did not
doubt that living functions are far more mysterious, complex, and elusive than mere
clockwork. Bichat offered his readers a concise and articulate theoretical statement in
support ofa widely assumed position. It can be summed up by saying that the physical
sciences are concerned with regular and hence predictable phenomena, whereas the
life sciences deal with infinitely variable and constantly altering events and situations.
His arguments, in their own terms, were both sensible and compelling, and most con-
temporary medical men assented to them. Indeed, they were taught in the medical
schools well into the nineteenth century.
Bichat wrote as follows concerning the question of predictability and variability in
the natural world:
[Vital powers] vary incessantly in their intensity, energy, development; they are constantly passing from
the lowest degree ofprostration to the highest pitch ofexaltation and they assume a thousand modifica-
tions under the influence of the most trifling causes. For the animal is influenced by everything arouind
him; he wakes, he sleeps, rests or exercises himself, digests or is hungry, is subject to his own passions,
and to the actions of foreign bodies. On the contrary, the physical laws are invariable, always the same
and the source ofa series of phenomena which are always the same. Attraction is a physical power; it is
always in proportion to the mass ofbrute matter in which it is observed; sensibility is a vital power, but in
the same mass ofmatter, in the same organic part, its quantity is perpetually changing.
With mathematics, he went on, one can calculate the return of a comet or the
resistance of fluid passing through an inert canal. But to calculate the force of a
muscle with Borelli, the velocity ofblood flow with Keill, or the quantity of air in the
lungs with Lavoisier is to build a solid house on shifting sand. One never knows vital
fluids after a single analysis, because urine, bile, and saliva vary throughout the day,
during disease, and with age. "The instability ofthe vital powers is thequicksand upon
which the calculation of all the physicians of the last century has sunk." The major
problem with physiology, Bichat contended, is that it was developed only after
physics. Had it been cultivated before, men might have made applications from the
former to the latter, rather than the other way around. In that case, rivers might have
been seen to flow from the tonic action of their banks, crystals to unite from the
excitement they exercise upon their reciprocal sensibilities, and planets to move
because they mutually irritate one another at great distances. Today, we would con-
sider the application of such language to the phenomena of physics a reversion to a
more primitive, even animistic conception ofnature. Bichat, however, was not looking
backward toward a simpler or more superstitious age, but rather forward to one in
which medical studies would attain a new level of theoretical coherence and
methodological sophistication.
Most vitalists were prepared to concede some accessory status to physics and
chemistry in the study of life. Bichat, however, emphatically denied even that, claim-
ing that those sciences are wholly alien to it:
There are two classes of beings in nature, two classes ofproperty and two classes ofscience. Beings are
organic and inorganic, properties vital and non-vital, sciences physiological or physical .... The vital
properties are sensibility and contractility. The non-vital ones are gravity, affinity and elasticity.30
In his handwritten lecture notes, he said of Borelli's application of mechanics to the
30 Bichat, Anatomiegenrale, pp. 1-2.
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study of muscular forces that "The calculations are correct, but the principle from
which he begins is false because in each instance, the forces in muscles vary." It is a
mistake to consider, as did Boerhaave, that arteries, veins, and other canals in the
body act as inert tubes that behave in a precise and predictable manner. Although the
physiologist must know something ofthe laws of optics and acoustics, he must never
assume that vital laws and living activity are subject to calculation. Mathematics,
therefore, is of no use to physiology. "Insist here", he reminded himself, "on the
uselessness ofmathematics."'"
Bichat imitated Barthez' language on many occasions when he dealt with the sub-
jects of matter, natural law, and the role of the scientist. His views on matter and its
properties were unquestionably shaped by what Barthez had written on the subject.
Using words almost identical to those of the Montpellier vitalist, Bichat wrote, "Let
us pay homage to the immortal Newton; he was the first to find the Creator's secret,
namely that of uniting a simplicity of causes to a multiplicity of effects." As we
observed earlier, Barthez had set himselfapart both from physicians, who enumerated
large numbers of causes for physiological phenomena, and from the animists and
mechanists, whotried toassign all livingactivity toasinglecause. Somewhat perversely,
Bichat turned Barthez' own words about the "simplicity ofcauses" and "multiplicity
of effects" against him, accusing him of the same fault as that of the dualists.32 He
described the vital principle as an empty word, "an assumption as void of truth as to
suppose one sole acting principle governing all the phenomena of physics. Amongst
the latter, some are derived from gravity, others from elasticity, and still others from
affinity. So in the living economy, some result from sensibility, others from con-
tractility and so on." Unable to conceive ofthese properties as components ofmatter,
Barthez had placed them in the vital principle. With somejustification, Bichat merely
dismissed as a chimera this notion ofa substance that is neither soul nor matter.
However we might be inclined to interpret it, Bichat sincerely believed that his own
particular analysis ofthe body as governed by vital forces was superior to those ofall
his predecessors. Indeed, he was largely correct when he implied that they had fre-
quently confused words with substantially demonstrated causes. The trouble with the
archeus, the soul, and the vital principle, he wrote, is that each one in turn was taken
to be the common basis of every physiological explanation, a kind of first cause.
Certainly Stahl and Barthez, at least, would have denied searching for or naming first
causes. Indeed, the charge was a particularly nasty one to aim at Barthez, who saw
himself as a staunch Newtonian. And as we observed, neither Helmont nor Barthez
31 Bichat, op. cit., note 17 above. A somewhat differently slanted interpretation of Bichat's attitude to the
mechanical sciences is found in Geoffrey Sutton, 'The physical and chemical path to vitalism: Xavier
Bichat's Physiological researches on life and death', Bull. Hist. Med., 1984, 58: 53-71. Largely examining
Bichat's experiments on the death ofthe heart, lungs, and brain, Sutton emphasizes Bichat's preoccupation
with the mechanical action of the heart, which sustains the life of the tissues. The centre of the organic or
fundamental life and especially of insensible organic contractility, the heart is the centre of mechanical
agitation. The activity of the brain, the centre of the animal life, however, is different in its nature. To
demonstrate that, Sutton contends, Bichat was working with the new techniques ofgalvanism. Interesting
and perceptive though his emphasis is, however, it does not detract from the insistence of Bichat on the two
sciences.
32These arguments are discussed in Rejane Bernier, 'La notion du principe vitale de Barthez', Archs.
Phil., 1975, 35: 423-441; and in Elizabeth Haigh, 'The vital principle of Paul Joseph Barthez: the clash
between monism and dualism', Med. Hist., 1977, 21: 1-14.
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really treated the archeus or vital principle respectively as sufficient explanation for all
living phenomena, but only for the ones Bichat assigned to the organic life. Bichat's
objections had really to do largely with their use of words. "Archeus" or "vital
principle" sound very much as though they represent causes. Bichat found such
theoretical props to be unacceptable, for, tending to seduce people into substituting
names for causes, they allow them to believe that they have accounted for those
causes, whose nature nevertheless remains unknown. Although one has to suppose
that general causes exist, he wrote, the scientist's eye should be directed to observing
their results." He appears not to have noticed that this was the very thing Barthez had
proposed to do.
According to Bichat, physical properties are permanently attached to matter,
whereas vital ones are only temporarily imposed upon it. Chaos, he wrote, would be a
state in which matter is devoid of all properties. At the creation, God endowed the
universe with gravity, elasticity, affinity, and so on. He animated a portion of it by
adding the properties ofsensibility and contractility to the physical ones. Life, then, is
added on to inert matter. This occurs when an object is brought into contact with
something alive, thus undergoing a kind ofinjection ofvitality. "In passing from time
to time through the living bodies, matter is penetrated at different intervals with the
vital properties which are found in combination with the physical ones." While they
are present, the vital properties dominate, so that "fettered by vital properties, the
physical ones are continually restrained in the phenomena which they tend to
produce." Bichat and Barthez here were divided largely on the question ofwhere the
sensible and contractile forces are located, the former assigning them to the tissues
and the latter to his hypothetical vital principle. In spite of relying so heavily on
Barthez' arguments about material properties, Bichat rarely mentioned his work
except to dismiss it. On this occasion, he offered merely a patronizing nod in the direc-
tion of Montpellier. "Our art is deeply indebted to several physicians of Montpellier
for having driven the Boerhaavian theories from the schools and for having embraced
the opposite ones of Stahl", he wrote, "but in departing from the false track which
they were pursuing, they have chosen in its place such a wild and tortuous path that I
doubt much ifthey will ever find an outlet."34
The vital properties, five in all according to Bichat, derive from the forces of
sensibility and irritability, which God conferred upon living matter. These properties
incorporate the data and speculations accumulated by Haller and by Bordeu. By
imposing his versatile notion of the two lives upon their theories and insights, Bichat
showed that their differences of opinion concerning the property of sensibility were
not substantial. Both men, he said, were correct in their observations and in their basic
conclusions. Their disagreement simply stemmed from the fact that they were talking
about the properties oftwo different lives. Bodily parts do possess unequal amounts of
sensibility and contractility, as Haller showed. They also owe their myriad automatic
functions to another sort of specific sensibility and contractility, as Bordeu pointed
out. Bichat's system even managed to resolve the conflict between Haller and Whytt,
whose observations often contradicted each other. The point, as he saw it, is "'that if
33 Bichat, La vieetlamort, pp. 92-98.
34 Bichat, Anatomiegenerale, pp. v-ix.
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these divisions had been clear and precise, ifthe words sensibility, irritability, tonicity,
etc., had all been used in the same sense by all, we would find in thewritings ofHaller,
of Lecat, of Whytt, of Haen, of all the Montpellier physicians, etc., few of those
disputes which were of no importance to science and tiresome for those who study
them."3"
The point, very simply, is that perception and motion exist in each ofthe two lives.
Their character in the animal life differs in many respects, however, from that in the
organic life. The following chart outlining the properties ofliving bodies is taken from
La vie et la mort.36
Classes Genus Species Varieties
Vital 1. Sensibility 1. Animal
2. Organic
2. Contractility 1. Animal




The sensibility ofthe organic lifeconsists in the faculty ofreceiving an impression in
a particular bodily part. It was this vital property that Bordeu treated when he
examined glandular functions. It is equivalent to Glisson'sperceptio naturalis. In the
animal life, however, the impression is referred to the brain, where it becomes con-
scious. When an animal responds to the abuse of some part of its body with cries of
pain, it is demonstrating animal sensibility, the property Haller described in his paper
'On the sensibility ofthe parts'. Bichat distinguishes the two sensibilities as follows:
The stomach is sensible to the presence of food, the heart to the stimulus ofblood, the excretory tube to
the contact ofthe fluid which is peculiar to it; but the term ofthis sensibility is in the organ itself. In the
same way do the eyes, the membranes of the nose and mouth, the skin and all the mucous surfaces at
their origin receive an impression from the bodies which are in contact with them, but afterwards they
transmit such impressions to the brain which is thegeneral centre ofthe sensibility ofthese organs.
The greater the amount of animal sensibility it possesses, the more "perfect" the
animal, for this vital property is the source of the sensations, the perceptions, and the
pleasure and pain that regulate them.
For the same reasons as Whytt, Bichat found Haller's classification of the bodily
parts into sensible and insensible categories to be too rigid. For example, Haller
believed ligaments to be insensible to painful stimuli. Bichat found that while they do
not respond to acids, alkalis, or cutting, they are pained when twisted, torn, or
distended. Though an animal is not conscious ofthe blood in its arteries, it cries when
a foreign fluid is injected, and so on. But Bichat's division of sensibility into two
categories was also too rigid. To make sense of the evidence, he had to admit tbat
animal and organic sensibility are the same in their essential categories, with animal
sensibility being a kind of maximum of its organic counterpart. Inflammation can
increase organic sensibility to a painful level. It becomes, thereby, animal sensibility.
On the other hand, habit can reduce animal sensibility to an organic or unconscious
3" Bichat, La vie et la mort, p. 133.
36 Ibid.; seealso Bichat, Anatomiegnerale, pp. xi-xiii, lxxii-lxxix.
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level. Every organ possesses sensibility, Bichat wrote, but there are a thousand degrees
of it between that limited to the organ itself and that perceived by the brain. This
admission, it would seem, should have detracted from his commitment to the animal-
organic division, but we find no evidence that it did so.
Like Bordeu, Bichat attributed each organ's activity to its own particular
sensibility. Because of it, the larynx is closed to everything but air, the intestinal
lacteals absorb only chyle, and so on. Alteration of the normal level of sensibility is
disease. Serous surfaces, for example, bathe for months in fluid they do not imbibe. If
their sensibility should be increased by inflammation, however, a new level comes into
equilibrium with that fluid, and absorption takes place, producing oedema.37
The two contractilities do not shade into each other, as the sensibilities do. Animal
contractility is subject to the will. It is located exclusively in the voluntary muscles and
functions in conjunction with the soul, the brain, and the nerves. Organic contractility
does not depend on a common centre but exists only in the moving organ itself. Both
are intimately linked to their corresponding sensibilities. In the animal life, the brain
and nerves transmit the signals between sensibility and contractility. Because the vital
properties exist in the same structures in the organic life, such transmission is not
necessary.
The vital property of organic contractility provided Bichat with some difficulties.
He found that he had to subdivide it in order to have it perform all the functions it
ought to. Sensible organic contractility, wrote Bichat, controls organs such as the
heart, stomach, intestines, and bladder. An insensible organic contractility governs
unperceived functions such as those of excretory ducts, secretion, lymphatics, and
other small organs where fluids are disseminated in very small quantities. Indeed, the
latter vital property is exercised upon mere molecules ofmatter. The two subdivisions
ought nevertheless to be classified together, he believed, because in spite of external
appearance, both types pertain only to the internal life and act independently of the
will. Indeed, they are connected by indeterminate gradations. Unlike the case with
sensibility, however, organic contractility can never be transformed into its animal
counterpart. For example, in no case can intestinal movements ever be made subject
to the will.3' The insensible organic contractility acted much like irritability, which in
Bordeu's terms, provokes a gland's sensibility, causing it to secrete its humour. It was
also closely related to the motus naturalis, which, according to Glisson, accompanies
the perceptio naturalis in the unconscious activities of the body. Clearly, animal con-
tractility is the same as the irritability Haller discovered in the voluntary muscles,
whilethe sensible organic contractility performs the same functions as the vis insita.
In the Anatomiege'nerale, Bichataskedwhethersensibility isa necessarycomponent
ofcontractility. Thework ofGlisson, Bordeu, and other Montpellier physicians treated
them as inseparable, whereas Haller had not. His particular system ofvital properties,
said Bichat, set this dispute at rest, along with many others. As in the case of other
arguments surrounding the two properties, his predecessors were all correct. "First, in
the animal life", Bichat wrote, "it is clear that contractility is not a necessary conse-
quence of sensibility; thus external objects often act upon us for a long time and yet
17 Bichat, La vieetlamort, pp. 99-1 1 1.
3 Ibid., pp. 112-121.
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the voluntary muscles are unmoved. On the other hand, in organic life, these two
properties are never separated."39
Bichat described two other properties ofliving tissue that are not, strictly speaking,
vital properties. That is, they do not leave animal tissue at death, but only when it has
decomposed. Thus they are, Bichat believed, more like properties of organization.
The extensibility and contractility oftexture are observed when the skin stretches with
tumours, obesity, or pregnancy, when the dura mater and bones of the cranium are
extended in hydrocephalus, and when abscesses or haemorrhages occur in the viscera.
When such extension ceases after weight loss, childbirth, draining ofabscesses, and so
on, the contractility immediately sets in. Many persons, he wrote, including Haller
and Barthez, had confused it with the phenomena properly belonging to the insensible
organic contractility.
The vital properties are not equally distributed throughout the various parts of the
body. A voluntary muscle possesses all the varieties of contractility. When it is
activated by nerves, it undergoes animal contractility; when it is excited to contract by
a chemical or physical agent directly applied to it, it undergoes sensible organic con-
tractility; when fluids enter it to provide nutrition, they provoke a small vibration in
each fibre which is the insensible organic contractilty; when the muscle is severed
transversely, the parts retract toward their points of insertion because of their con-
tractility oftexture. The heart and intestines lack animal contractility. Such organs as
tendons, aponeuroses, and bones possess only insensible organic contractility and con-
tractility of texture, and so on. Finally, a physiologist need not have recourse to any
forces but those ofsensibility, contractility, and tonicity. The use ofsuch terms as the
digestive power by Grimaud and theforcedesituationfixe by Barthez were erroneous
and confusing. The persons who used them were merely confusing the properties of
life with its results, Bichat contended.40
Having considered the subject ofgradual death due to ageing, Bichat turned in the
second part of La vie et la mort to the study of violent death from injury. He
examined, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the consequences ofinjury to the heart,
the lungs, and the brain, claiming that every sudden death begins by interruption of
the circulation, the respiration, or brain activity. While the organic life may exist both
before and after the animal life, the latter does not persist even for a moment once the
former is extinguished. He chose to study those three specific organs because he
believed that the two lives interact by way of the relationship among them. Each of
them is essential to the other two, "and since they constitute the three centres in which
all the secondary phenomena of the two lives are terminated, whenever they cease to
act, the phenomena which depend upon them must cease also and general death
ensue."1
By describing the three organs as centres, Bichat was reviving a theme with a long
history. He admitted as much, saying that physiologists have long been acquainted
with the importance of a triple focus oflife.4" To realizejust how long, we need only
remind ourselves ofthe tenacious Greek idea ofthree souls, or pneumata, in which life
"I Bichat, Anatomiegekneale, pp. cv-cvi.
40 Bichat, La vie et la mort, pp. 121-129.
41 Ibid., pp. 191-196.
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forces were presumed to reside. More recently, Sauvages stated that one of life's
essential features is the in.teraction of the heart and lungs with the soul, which of
course, resides in the brain. Bordeu located various centres ofsensibility and claimed
that the "brain, the heart, and the stomach are ... the triumvirate, the triple support
of life ... they are the three principal centres from which consciousness and motion
flow and to which they return after having circulated."42 In all these cases, it was taken
as axiomatic that forces are diffused from a central source. The tenacity ofthat belief
in a trinity ofsources or foci is possibly the most interesting puzzle ofall.
The observations concerning violent death were based, as we have observed, upon a
multitude ofcareful and often intricate experiments. The work demonstrates very well
how fundamental the animal-organic division was to Bichat's system. Countless
observations and experiments were interpreted in such a way as to make them
correspond to the demands that that division imposed.43 Bichat's physiological
system, which integrated an antimechanist viewpoint, the animal-organic division,
and the sensibility and contractility ofbodily parts, produced in total a rather satisfy-
ing system. Much about life and the body seemed to be explained in La vie et la mort.
The book appeared to take account of a very great many themes that ran through the
preceding century ofwork and speculation. In it, Bichat combined theviews ofHaller,
Whytt, Bordeu, Barthez, Grimaud, Buffon, and others. It was compelling material
and remarkably persuasive.
Indeed, Bichat's successors found that to take issue with his notions and to set offin
a different conceptual and theoretical direction was not always easy. Magendie was
one of the first to study and then to dismiss the animal-organic division in print. He
pointed out, sensibly enough when we look back on it, that it tended to separate
organs and phenomena that are, in fact, intimately connected. According to Bichat,
for example, the muscular apparatus that carries food from the mouth to the oeso-
phagus belongs to the animal life, whereas the rest ofthegastrointestinal tract belongs
to the organic life. Yet all work to a common end. The division, therefore, must be
arbitrary and deceptive. We can only concur with Magendie. Bichat's arguments on
behalf of the absolute separation of the laws and principles governing life from those
governing non-life, on the other hand, were somewhat more difficult to counter.
Living phenomena are, after all, almost infinitely variable, so that the predictability
that is so satisfying to physicists, astronomers, and chemists constantly eludes
physicians. It remained for the students ofthe life sciences to show that the variability
was not merely arbitrary, as Bichat believed, and above all, that it did not break
physical and chemical laws, as he maintained. Magendie's student Bernard
accomplished the task decisively, but not until the middle ofthe nineteenth century.
While La vie et la mort was being composed, Bichat was already involved with an
important new work in anatomy. The vital laws were of considerable importance to
the tissue theory of bodily structure. Those persons who approved of the tissue work
but considered vital theory to be backward were to be disturbed by the union ofthose
two ideas. For Bichat, however, the tissues were of special significance precisely because
he saw them as the structures in which vital forces reside and on which they act.
42 Bordeu, 'Maladies chroniques', op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 829-831.
43 A good analysis ofthese experiments is Sutton, op. cit., note 31 above. See also Chapter V.
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